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Key points 
With local elections due to take place in Turkey on March 30th, presidential elections on August 2nd and 
general elections in June 2015, the coming weeks and months will be decisive for the general tenor of the 
country‟s politics for the foreseeable future. Sadly, the state of democracy and rule of law in Turkey has 
deteriorated due to the government‟s mishandling of a series of toxic political scandals in recent months. At 
the same time, the stagnation in Turkey‟s accession process continues to sour relations with the EU. The 
European Commission‟s so-called “Positive Agenda” is virtually on life-support and needs a fresh injection 
if the vicious circles now affecting bilateral relations are to be turned into virtuous ones. 
Main recommendations 
 The European Council and the European Commission should go beyond token expressions of concern 
about the decline in democratic standards and rule of law in Turkey. They should endeavour to tackle 
head on the challenges to the Copenhagen political criteria in Turkey. 
 In line with the EU‟s “New Approach” to accession negotiations, which centres on the early opening of 
chapters 23 (judiciary and fundamental rights) and 24 (justice, freedom and security) to secure not just 
reform on paper, but to establish a track record in implementation throughout the accession process, the 
European Commission should be given the signal to start such talks with Turkey. To that end, member 
states, Cyprus in particular, need to be persuaded to end their opposition to formulating benchmarks for 
the opening of accession negotiating chapters 23 and 24. 
 Screening reports and Action Plans should be adopted to guide the negotiations in chapters 23 and 24. 
At the opening of these chapters, interim benchmarks could be set by the member states. Only when 
these interim benchmarks have been met sufficiently would closing benchmarks be adopted. 
 In order to help Turkey fulfil the commitments made in its Action Plans, financial and technical 
assistance would have to be mobilised under the Technical Assistance and Information Exchange 
instrument (TAIEX) of the Commission and the Instrument for Pre-accession Assistance (2014-2020). 
These supporting measures would have to be targeted at the early stages of the process and take a 
sectoral approach, including budget support based on concrete and comprehensive plans.
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Something rotten in the state of Turkey 
Concerns about the deterioration of democracy 
in Turkey are not new: the trials over the 2003 
„Sledgehammer‟ alleged coup plan (2010-12) and 
over the ‟Ergenekon‟ secret organisation (2008-
13) broke the military‟s influence over politics, 
but were widely criticised because of their 
reliance on secret witnesses and disputes over 
evidence. Ironically, their outcome has recently 
been challenged by Prime Minister Erdoğan 
himself, who has disowned the trials now that 
the judiciary has the AK Party in its sights.1 
International concern was also stirred by the 
violent crackdown on the countrywide protests 
of May/June 2013. Unrest then was triggered by 
the planned redevelopment of Istanbul‟s Gezi 
Park in May 2013, but developed into a wider 
movement critical of government corruption, 
increasing restrictions on freedom of speech and 
concerns about the erosion of secularism. 
Protests simmered on through September, 
winding down in autumn and winter only to 
reignite in March of this year. 
The latest wave of developments was triggered 
by the launch of a judicial probe into a series of 
real-estate deals in mid-December, culminating 
in the arrests of over 50 officials and 
businessmen close to the ruling AKP. Three 
ministers, whose sons had been implicated, 
resigned: one of them, Environment Minister 
Bayraktar, publicly called on Erdoğan to step 
down as well. In an effort to smother the 
rebellion against his (party‟s) rule, Prime 
Minister Erdoğan reacted on the 25th of 
December by announcing the reshuffle of seven 
other members of his cabinet, including the 
Minister for European Affairs, who was 
implicated in the ongoing investigation. But this 
did not stem the tide: in January and February 
the government was rocked by the release of 
recordings and videos contributing to 
continuing allegations of high-level corruption, 
leading to ever louder calls for the Prime 
Minister himself to be investigated for 
                                                     
1 T. Arango, “Turkish leader disowns trials that helped 
him tame military”, New York Times, 26 February 2014. 
corruption. Indeed, the circle seemed to be 
closing in on Erdoğan himself, with the release 
of a recording in which he purportedly tells his 
son to hide millions of dollars. The whole 
episode has been depicted as part of a broader 
power struggle between Erdoğan and his former 
ally Fetullah Gülen, Turkey‟s most influential 
cleric and leader of a worldwide religious civil 
society movement named after him.2  Erdoğan 
has accused Gülen and his followers of 
concocting the graft investigation to undermine 
the AKP before the elections. According to 
Erdoğan, who also alleged the involvement of 
the US Ambassador, Gülen wields great 
influence over what he terms Turkey‟s “parallel 
state” - the upper echelons of the bureaucracy, 
police and judiciary. However, the preacher 
denies any link to the probe. 
The government‟s reaction to the ongoing 
investigation has resulted in a blurring of the 
separation of powers and the curtailing of civil 
liberties. In particular, in the aftermath of the 
arrests in December the government relocated 
nearly 100 judges and prosecutors, and 
dismissed or reassigned nearly 500 police 
officers, including Istanbul‟s chief of police. Also 
in January, a package of measures modifying 
the status of the Supreme Board of Judges and 
Prosecutors and granting the Minister of Justice 
increased authority over appointments of judges 
and prosecutors was approved, with limited 
amendments. A contentious medical bill, 
potentially criminalising the treatment of 
wounded protesters, was also signed into law. 
In February, parliament passed a law expanding 
the powers of the National Intelligence 
Organisation (MİT). Upon the authorisation of a 
single judge at an Ankara criminal court, the spy 
agency will be able to access the databases of 
banks and other commercial corporations, and 
conduct wire tappings to collect data related to 
foreign intelligence, national defence, terrorism 
and cyber security. Censorship was stepped up 
with the passing of highly controversial 
amendments to Law 5651 on the “Regulation of 
                                                     
2 D. Dombey, F. Guler and D. Gardner, “Showdown”, 
Financial Times, 19 March 2014. 
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Publications on the Internet and Suppression of 
Crimes Committed by means of such 
Publication”, allowing authorities to block 
websites and collect extensive browsing data 
from users. From 2008 to 2010 the country had 
already experienced a ban on YouTube when 
the government blocked access to the website 
because of videos deemed insulting to the 
country‟s founder, Mustafa Kemal Ataturk. 
Most recently, after Erdoğan voiced his anger 
that people used Twitter to spread allegations of 
corruption about members of his inner circle, 
the government blocked the website. President 
Gül, who, like many others, evaded the ban 
tweeted that the shutdown on social media was 
unacceptable. The overall level of press freedom 
remains a matter of grave concern: in the 2014 
World Press Freedom Index published in 
February, Turkey dropped six places and was 
ranked 154th. The report also marks an 
increasing tendency for self-censorship, 
remarking Turkey “remains the world‟s biggest 
prison for journalists”.3 
The government‟s restriction of civil liberties is 
not the only worrying development for the 
country. Turkey‟s situation is also becoming 
increasingly problematic in economic and 
diplomatic terms. 
The crackdown on civil liberties, combined with 
the global effect of rising interest rates in the US, 
has led to pressure on the Turkish lira. To 
prevent outflows, the central bank was forced to 
hike interest rates, raising the overnight rate 
from 7.75% to 12%. The government did not rule 
out further measures to stabilise the situation, 
although the imposition of capital controls was 
excluded. Global economic volatility in 
emerging markets, combined with lower than 
expected economic growth and continuing 
political uncertainty, may well affect Turkey‟s 
attractiveness to foreign investors, adding to the 
government‟s difficulties. 
Moreover, Turkey‟s ambitions of a „zero 
problems with the neighbours‟ policy 
                                                     
3  See “Reporters without Borders” 
(https://rsf.org/index2014/en-index2014.php#). 
announced at the outset of the current 
legislature seem to be slipping further away. 
While the resumption of talks with Cyprus in 
February should be welcomed, the dispute is far 
from being solved, although Erdoğan‟s need for 
foreign policy successes could aid the 
negotiations. Relations with Israel are still 
marred by the Gaza flotilla incident of May 
2010. Relations with the US are suffering not 
only as a result of Erdoğan‟s talk of an 
international conspiracy against his 
government, but also because of Turkey‟s lax 
policy towards the Syrian border and by its 
decision in September to purchase a Chinese 
missile defence system, which will probably 
pose compatibility issues with NATO‟s own 
systems. The biggest reverses in diplomatic 
terms stem from regional developments: 
Turkey‟s support of the Muslim Brotherhood in 
Egypt, even after the ousting of President Morsi, 
has soured its relations with its Sunni partners, 
especially Egypt and Saudi Arabia. 
Turkey‟s domestic politics, economic fortunes, 
and international relations now seem to be 
tightly interwoven with the Prime Minister and 
his own fate. As Erdoğan desperately tries to 
hold on to power by deflecting the legal inquiry 
closing in on him, there is an increasingly 
palpable risk that he might fatally undermine 
the very foundations of Turkey‟s democracy 
and rule of law, dragging them down with him. 
Token expressions of concern will no 
longer do 
Events in Turkey since the spring 2013 protests 
in Gezi Park and Taksim Square have soured 
relations with the EU, at a time when the 
accession process seemed to be gradually 
regaining momentum.4 On the surface, the EU‟s 
                                                     
4  Statement by EU High Representative Catherine 
Ashton on the latest developments in Turkey, 12 June 
2013 (http://www.consilium.europa.eu/uedocs/ 
cms_Data/docs/pressdata/EN/foraff/137451.pdf); 
Speech by Štefan Füle at the Plenary Session of the 
European Parliament, Strasbourg, 12 June 2013. 
(http://europa.eu/rapid/press-release_SPEECH-13-
526_en.htm). 
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reaction to developments in Turkey has been 
rather subdued, but there are grave underlying 
concerns about the deterioration of democracy 
and the rule of law in the country. The 
European Parliament‟s April 2013 resolution on 
Turkey expressed concerns about the human 
rights situation and stressed the need for judicial 
reform, reiterating calls to revise the legal 
framework on freedom of expression. 5  In its 
annual report of October 2013, the European 
Commission welcomed progress in certain 
areas, but criticised a political climate marked 
by polarisation, which translated into “an 
understanding of democracy as relying 
exclusively on parliamentary majority, rather 
than a participative process in which all voices 
are heard”.6 The Commission also pointed out 
that “key provisions of the Turkish legal 
framework and their interpretation by the 
judiciary continue to hamper respect for 
fundamental freedoms, including freedom of 
expression.” 
In contrast to the sharp decline in standards 
since the publication of the Commission‟s 
Annual Report, EU leaders at the beginning of 
this year stressed productive discussions with 
Prime Minister Erdoğan (on his first visit to 
Brussels in five years) and welcomed Turkish 
commitments to continue on the path of reform. 
They did not go beyond voicing “concern” or, at 
most “serious concerns” over the continuing 
restriction of democratic freedoms. 7  After the 
                                                     
5European Parliament resolution of 18 April 2013 on the 
2012 Progress Report on Turkey, 
(http://www.europarl.europa.eu/sides/getDoc.do?pu
bRef=-//EP//TEXT+TA+P7-TA-2013-
0184+0+DOC+XML+V0//EN). 
6 “Key Findings of the 2013 Progress Report on Turkey”, 
16 October 2013 (http://europa.eu/rapid/press-
release_MEMO-13-895_en.htm). 
7 Remarks by President of the European Council  
Herman Van Rompuy after his meeting with Prime 
Minister of Turkey Recep Tayyip Erdoğan, 21 January 
2014 (http://www.consilium.europa.eu/uedocs/ 
cms_data/docs/pressdata/en/ec/140694.pdf); 
Statement by President Barroso following the meeting 
with Prime Minister Erdoğan of Turkey, 21 January 
2014 (http://europa.eu/rapid/press-release_SPEECH-
14-43_en.htm). 
passing of the controversial internet censorship 
law, the Commission agreed to “share in writing 
a number of the concerns identified, regarding 
both compatibility with the acquis and EU best 
practices”. 8  In reaction to the move to block 
Twitter, EU Commissioner for Enlargement 
Štefan Füle upped the ante and said that it 
“raises grave concerns and casts doubt on 
Turkey‟s stated commitment to European values 
and standards.”9 
On the whole, member states have been more 
dismissive in their criticism, with German 
Foreign Minister Steinmeier stating that 
Erdoğan‟s recent actions had put the accession 
process at risk, 10  while French President 
François Hollande made clear his opposition to 
opening new negotiating chapters during his 
visit to Turkey in January.11 German Chancellor 
Angela Merkel too has remained sceptical about 
full Turkish membership of the Union. 12 
Together with the recently passed motion by the 
European Parliament on Turkey, expressing 
“deep concern” over recent developments, key 
member states‟ positions are forcing the EU 
executive to take a tougher line.13 
                                                     
8  “EU-Turkey: Ministerial dialogue in Brussels“, 10 
February 2014 (http://europa.eu/rapid/press-
release_STATEMENT-14-1_en.htm). 
9 “Statement of Commissioner Štefan Füle on the 
blocking of Twitter in Turkey”, 21 March 
2014(http://ec.europa.eu/commission_2010-
2014/fule/headlines/news/2014/03/20140321_en.htm)
Commission VP Kroes was even more outspoken when 
she tweeted: „The Twitter ban in #Turkey is groundless, 
pointless, cowardly. Turkish people and the intl. 
community will see this as censorship. It is.‟ 
(https://twitter.com/NeelieKroesEU/status/446784267
541291008). 
10 “Germany criticizes Turkey PM ahead of EU visit”, 21 
January 2014 (http://euobserver.com/foreign/122806). 
11  “Hollande declines to open new EU chapter in 
Turkey”, EU Observer, 28 January 2014 
(http://euobserver.com/foreign/122889). 
12  “Erdogan struggles with Merkel‟s scepticism on 
Turkey‟s EU bid”, 4 February 2014 
(http://uk.reuters.com/article/2014/02/04/uk-turkey-
germany-eu-idUKBREA130YZ20140204). 
13 European Parliament resolution on the 2013 progress 
report on Turkey, 12 March 2014 
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The slight differences in the tone of reactions of 
member states and EU institutions should not 
conceal the fact that both sets of actors face the 
same underlying dilemma: by more firmly 
condemning developments in Turkey, or by 
threatening to suspend accession negotiations, 
there is the risk of undermining cooperation on 
issues of mutual concern and losing all 
remaining leverage over the political process 
within the country. Arguably, the degree of 
leverage possessed by the EU has already 
diminished since the start of negotiations in 
2005, as the prospect of Turkish membership 
was pushed further and further into the future. 
In particular, France and Cyprus have stalled 
the talks, with each vetoing the opening of 
several negotiating chapters, including chapters 
23 (judiciary and fundamental rights) and 24 
(justice, freedom and security). Cyprus argued 
that Ankara first needed to normalise relations 
with Nicosia.14 After two years of not opening 
negotiating chapters, in May 2012 the European 
Commission tried to reinvigorate the process 
with a so-called “Positive Agenda”. In the last 
two months of 2013 this resulted in the opening 
of negotiations on chapter 22 on regional policy, 
the signing of a readmission agreement and the 
adoption of a visa liberalisation roadmap. This 
did little to address the root causes of the 
lethargy in relations, however. 
Like the EU, Turkey itself is increasingly 
struggling to view the negotiations as genuine, 
with public support for membership having 
declined in recent years.15 When speaking at a 
                                                                                       
(http://www.europarl.europa.eu/sides/getDoc.do?pu
bRef=-%2f%2fEP%2f%2fTEXT%2bMOTION%2bB7-
2014-
0241%2b0%2bDOC%2bXML%2bV0%2f%2fEN&languag
e=EN). 
14 France is blocking the opening of 4 chapters, Cyprus 
of 6 others. See “Turkey-EU 
Relations”(http://www.mfa.gov.tr/relations-between-
turkey-and-the-european-union.en.mfa). 
15  Turkey, European Union relations experiencing 
„chilly‟ period: Poll, Hurriyet Daily News, 19 September 
2013 (http://www.hurriyetdailynews.com/turkey-
european-union-relations-experiencing-chilly-period-
poll.aspx?PageID=238&NID=54709&NewsCatID=351). 
CEPS event to commemorate the 50th 
anniversary of the Association Agreement in 
September 2013, Turkish Ambassador to the EU 
Selim Yenel argued that unless substantial 
progress in the pre-accession process was made 
by mid-2014, Turkey would have to pull the 
plug on accession negotiations and propose a 
new agenda for advanced relations with the 
EU. 16  In sum, these developments and 
perceptions mean that the accession process 
might well be less important than it has ever 
been in the general framework of EU-Turkey 
relations. 
Several important events loom on the horizon. 
The results of the local elections across Turkey 
at the end of March will be key in showing the 
extent to which the developments over the past 
year have dented the AKP‟s popularity. While 
the party undoubtedly enjoys wide support, 
Erdoğan‟s reaction to a potentially negative 
outcome of the local elections will be crucial: it 
is expected that he will announce whether or not 
he intends to stand for the first direct 
presidential elections, scheduled for August 
2014. Alternatively, he could also attempt to 
change the AKP‟s internal regulations to stand 
for a fourth term as Prime Minister. In this 
context, it is important to recall the 
OSCE/ODHIR report about the 2011 
parliamentary elections, stating there was a 
need “to ensure the equality of vote weight 
among constituencies, lifting certain existing 
restrictions on suffrage rights, and enhancing 
transparency in the complaints and appeals 
process”. 17  Any hints about moves to 
manipulate the outcome of the upcoming 
elections would of course heighten the EU‟s 
concerns about further rollbacks in the country‟s 
democratic institutions and practices and lead to 
a further souring of relations.  
                                                     
16  CEPS News, October 2013 
(http://www.ceps.eu/system/files/simplenews/2013/
09/CNOctweb.pdf). 
17 OSCE/ODIHR Election Assessment Mission Report, 
12 June 2011 (http://www.osce.org/odihr/84588). 
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Back to basics: respect for the principle 
of democracy and the rule of law 
As the accession process stalls and democratic 
advances within Turkey are reversed, it is time 
for the EU to reassess its relationship with 
Turkey and turn the vicious circles now 
affecting bilateral relations into virtuous ones. 
The 2009 Enlargement Strategy highlighted the 
rule of law as one of the key challenges within 
the enlargement process: “In line with the 
renewed consensus on enlargement [agreed to 
by the December 2006 European Council] and 
taking into account experience from the fifth 
enlargement, the rule of law is a key priority 
which needs to be addressed by the countries 
concerned at an early stage of the accession 
process. With EU assistance, some progress has 
been made in putting into place effective 
legislation and structures to fight corruption 
and organised crime, but rigorous 
implementation and enforcement of laws are 
necessary to achieve tangible results”.18 
In the framework of the Positive Agenda, 
working groups were established on the 
following chapters: 3 (right of establishment and 
freedom to provide services); 6 (company law); 
10 (information society and media); 18 
(statistics); 28 (consumer and health protection); 
and 32 (financial control). Crucially, separate 
working groups were set up to deal with 
fundamental rights and justice matters covered 
by chapters 23 19  and 24. 20  Whereas the work 
                                                     
18  Communication from the Commission to the 
European Parliament and the Council, “Enlargement 
Strategy and Main Challenges 2009-2010”, COM(2009) 
533, Brussels, 14 October 2009 
(http://ec.europa.eu/enlargement/pdf/key_document
s/2009/strategy_paper_2009_en.pdf). 
19  Chapter 23 covers the independence, impartiality, 
integrity and efficiency of the judiciary, the fight against 
corruption, and respect for fundamental rights and EU 
citizens‟ rights, as guaranteed by the acquis and by the 
EU Charter of Fundamental Rights. 
20  Chapter 24 covers the fight against all types of 
organised crime (including drug and arms trafficking, 
trafficking in human beings etc.) and terrorism, the 
Schengen rules, border control and visas, as well as 
carried out by these groups has led to a number 
of closing benchmarks being confirmed in the 
areas of company law, consumer and health 
protection, and financial control, progress has 
been forestalled in the area of rule of law, with 
no opening benchmarks being communicated to 
Turkey.21 The EU ought to overcome its internal 
impasse and unleash the potential of chapters 23 
and 24 to address the troubling state of 
democratic principles and rule of law in Turkey.  
In tune with the EU‟s “new approach” to 
accession negotiations, which centres on the 
early opening of chapters 23 and 24 in order to 
monitor not just reform on paper but also in 
practice throughout the entire negotiating 
period,22 the European Commission should be 
given the signal to start such talks with Turkey. 
To that end, member states – Cyprus in 
particular – need to be persuaded to give up 
their opposition in order to let the Council 
decide on benchmarks for the opening of 
accession negotiating chapters 23 and 24. One 
argument that may serve that purpose is that, 
apart from adopting opening benchmarks to 
prioritise key issues in the realm of these two 
chapters, member states are in the position to 
introduce interim and closing benchmarks along 
the way. As such, they can determine the course 
of reforms at all stages of the accession 
negotiations so that a solid track record of 
implementation of reforms is achieved. 
Moreover, the introduction of benchmarks could 
serve to overcome the limited amount of „hard 
acquis‟ (i.e. clear and unambiguous EU rules) in 
some of the areas covered by chapters 23 and 24, 
which would otherwise make it difficult to 
                                                                                       
migration, asylum, judicial cooperation in criminal and 
civil matters and police and customs cooperation. 
21 Turkey: EU political benchmarks “were never given 
to us”, EurActiv, 7 February 2013 
(http://www.euractiv.com/enlargement/got-
necessary-eu-benchmarks-turk-news-517614). 
22  Communication from the Commission to the 
European Parliament and the Council, “Enlargement 
Strategyand Main Challenges 2011-2012”, COM(2011) 
666, 12 October 2011, at 5. See also the General Affairs 
Council Conclusions of 5 December 2011, point 4, and 
the European Council Conclusions of 9 December 2011. 
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determine exactly which targets need to be met 
in order to comply with general principles and 
European standards.23 
To achieve this, screening meetings for chapters 
23 and 24 would have to be convened as soon as 
possible. Screening reports should be adopted, 
setting out the framework for negotiations. In 
response, Action Plans would have to be drawn 
up by Ankara, detailing the tasks to be 
addressed by Turkey, as well as laying down 
clear roadmaps for the negotiations. Thus, the 
Action Plans would effectively constitute the 
opening benchmarks for chapters 23 and 24. 
Interim benchmarks could be set by the member 
states when negotiations are opened. Closing 
benchmarks would only be adopted once the 
interim benchmarks have been met. The closing 
benchmarks would require Turkey to 
demonstrate a solid track record of reform 
implementation. Only when the closing 
requirements in chapters 23 and 24 are met 
could all other chapters be permanently closed. 
In order to help Turkey fulfil the commitments 
made in its Action Plans, financial and technical 
assistance would have to be mobilised under the 
Technical Assistance and Information Exchange 
instrument (TAIEX) and the second edition of 
the Instrument for Pre-accession Assistance 
(2014-2020). These supporting measures would 
have to be targeted at the early stages of the 
process and take a sectoral approach, including 
budget support based on concrete and 
comprehensive plans. 24  If necessary, the 
                                                     
23  It has been argued that the material substance of 
chapter 23 should in fact be categorised under the third 
Copenhagen criterion (i.e. the candidate‟s ability to take 
on the obligations of membership) rather than the first 
(i.e. political) criterion, since it is “no longer regarded 
solely as an eligibility condition (i.e. prerequisite for 
starting accession negotiations) as suggested by Article 
49(1) TEU. Fundamental rights are also conceived as an 
integral part of the EU acquis which the candidate has to 
assimilate (….)”. See C. Hillion, “Enlarging the 
European Union and deepening its fundamental rights 
protection”, SIEPS European Policy Analysis 2013:11. 
See also W. Nozar, “The 100% Union: The Rise of 
Chapters 23 and 24”, Clingendael Paper, August 2012. 
24 Nozar, ibid., at 3. 
accountability of Turkey could be increased by, 
for example, requesting a new or amended 
Action Plan from Ankara or by adopting 
additions to interim benchmarks. If progress on 
chapters 23 and 24 were to significantly lag 
behind overall progress, then the “new 
approach” would allow for the adoption of so-
called “corrective measures” to stop or slow 
down negotiations on other chapters until the 
thorny issues are resolved.25 It is for the Council 
to decide by qualified majority on a proposal 
from the Commission and on the conditions for 
lifting the measures taken. Based on the 
“importance of [chapters 23 and 24] for the 
implementation of the acquis across the board”,26 
the Council could thus decide to suspend 
accession negotiations completely in case of 
serious and persistent breaches of the principles 
of democracy, respect for fundamental rights 
and the rule of law. 
In sum, the application of the “new approach” 
to accession negotiations with Turkey would 
lead to a stronger focus on democracy and the 
rule of law. It would introduce extra time and a 
more structured approach to monitoring and 
assistance to tackle the prickly issues at hand. 
Moreover, it would link progress in accession 
talks overall more directly to progress in these 
crucial domains. This would ensure that reforms 
produce a solid track record of implementation 
before actual accession. 
                                                     
25  Ibid. See also General EU Position, Ministerial 
meeting opening the Intergovernmental conference on 
the accession of Montenegro to the European Union, 
AD 23/12, 27 June 2012, para. 25: “should progress 
under [chapters 23 and 24] significantly lag behind 
progress in the negotiations overall, and after having 
exhausted all other available measures, the Commission 
will on its own initiative or on the request of one third 
of the Member States propose to withhold its 
recommendations to open and/or close other 
negotiating chapters, and adapt the associated 
preparatory work, as appropriate until this imbalance is 
addressed.” 
26 Ibid. 
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Concluding remarks 
Opening negotiations on chapters 23 and 24 
could lead to a greater engagement with Turkey 
in two delicate fields, giving new impetus to 
reform within the country: indeed, past reforms 
have been carried out when there was 
momentum behind the negotiating process. 
With renewed momentum, it may even be 
possible to realise membership of Turkey in the 
Union by 2023, the 100th anniversary of the 
Turkish Republic.27 
Should the opening of chapters 23 and 24 not 
prove enough to engage Turkey and to restart 
the accession process in earnest, it will become 
increasingly likely that the plug will indeed 
have to be pulled on the negotiations and that 
other frameworks in which to pursue further 
cooperation and integration will have to be 
considered. Several such modalities have been 
suggested: ranging from a partnership focused 
on security and energy co-operation to 
selectively deep integration within an 
increasingly differentiated EU, 28  and even an 
associate membership of the EU. 29  Whatever 
merit there may be in each of the proposals, the 
EU should not be seen to renege on its own 
commitments. A serious attempt should 
therefore be made to push the accession process 
forward, based on sustained compliance with 
the norms set out in chapters 23 and 24. 
                                                     
27 In 2006, European Commission President Barroso said 
that the accession process will take at least until 2021. In 
a visit to Germany on 31 October 2012, Turkish Prime 
Minister Erdoğan made clear that Turkey was expecting 
membership in the Union to be realised by 2023, 
implying that Ankara could end membership 
negotiations if the talks had not yielded a positive result 
by then. 
28 N. Tocci and D. Bechev, “Will Turkey Find its Place in 
Post-Crisis Europe?”, in Global Turkey in Europe: Political, 
Economic, and Foreign Policy Dimensions of Turkey’s 
Evolving Relationship with the EU, IAI Research Paper, 
2013 (http://www.iai.it/pdf/Quaderni/iairp_09.pdf). 
29 See A. Duff, “The case for an Associate Membership 
of the European Union” 
(http://www.spinelligroup.eu/article/case-associate-
membership-european-union). 
